A Solution to the Elections Impasse
By
Sama Hadad & Yasser Alaskary
Wednesday, February 15, 2004
The
lingering stalemate between the US-led Coalition Provisional
Authority and Ayatullah Sistani on the issue of elections
may have a simple solution that seems to have eluded many
owing to the complex nature of the current agreement. The
November 15th plan, agreed on by the coalition and the Iraqi
Governing Council, would establish 18 selected provincial
caucuses, which would in turn choose a transitional legislative
assembly. The assembly would then appoint an executive,
which subsequently approves a cabinet. Ayatullah Sistani
has rejected this plan, insisting on elections to determine
the transitional government.
The result
of this disagreement has been fierce debates about the feasibility
and desirability of holding elections to choose members
of the national assembly. A simple solution to the dispute
is to separate the currently intertwined processes of selecting
the legislature and that of the executive. This would introduce
the option of holding elections to choose the executive,
whether it be a president or presidential council, and at
the same time maintaining the caucus plan to appoint an
assembly. Presidential elections do not carry many of the
problems and obstacles posed by elections for members of
an assembly.
A presidential
election would be much simpler than holding general elections
for the several hundred seats of parliament. It does not
rely on a mature political party system, which Iraq lacks
and is often an argument used against elections for the
transitional assembly. Extremists or Ba'athists would not
stand a chance of slipping through, a real possibility that
exists under an assembly chosen by general elections. Moreover,
elections for a president do not require as robust a voter
registration as elections to choose the many seats of the
assembly, as the former allows for a greater margin of error.
Furthermore, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, commander
of coalition ground forces in Iraq, addressed concerns of
security preventing free and fair elections stating "We
will be able to provide for security that is necessary across
the country."
The complexity
of the current plan, a fact that has undoubtedly contributed
to the current opposition, makes any outcome impossible
to predict. The fate of both the legislature and executive
rests on this uncertainty. Iraqis calling for elections
fear that too much relies on a process which, in their eyes,
is vulnerable to being rigged. Sistani's edicts have never
specified that elections must be held to determine the national
assembly, but rather the transitional government. A presidential
election would allay fears and resolve Sistani's misgivings.
The exact mechanism
for electing the executive can be customized according to
whether Iraq decides on a presidency council or a single
president. For example, the current draft of the transitional
constitution envisages a tripartite presidency council.
Under presidential elections this can be formed by the three
winning candidates, who between them would likely hold the
support of the majority of Iraq.
Separating
the two processes for selecting the legislative and an executive
can break the current deadlock. The balance between an elected
executive, which will give the transitional government the
legitimacy Iraqis desire, and a selected legislative, which
will aid for a smooth handover of sovereignty, can produce
a stable transition for a blossoming democracy.
