Crushing the
insurgency and stabilising Iraq
By
Sama Hadad
Monday, November 23, 2004
Published: openDemocracy
American
and new Iraqi forces rapidly occupied the insurgent stronghold
city of Falluja and are almost in complete control. While
the military campaign has been a success the fact there
was a need for Operation Phantom Fury signals a significant
failure of policy - namely that of 're-Ba'athification'.
Following
the fall of Saddam, Ayad Allawi, along with his supporters
in Washington, fiercely opposed both de-Baathification,
and the disbanding of the former Saddam army. Because Allawi's
Iraqi National Accord draws its support from former Baathists
and the Sunni elite, his opposition to the de-Baathification
policy is understandable.
Whilst
American forces had Falluja in a tight grip in April, mounting
international pressure and civilian casualties led Washington
to abandon its year-old de-Baathification policy and to
resort to forming the Falluja Brigade made up of former
Baathists. This signaled the beginning of a wave of appointments
of high ranking Baathists to top security service and government
posts - just as Allawi had been advocating. Their thinking
was that appointing former Sunni elite and Baathists in
positions of power would kill two birds with one stone:
make use of their 'expertise' as well as appease the Sunni
population.
Falluja
was left in the hands of a newly formed Falluja Brigade,
under the command of Jasim Muhammed Salih. To the embarrassment
of the CPA, Salih was removed days after his appointment
because opposition mounted against his past as a chief of
staff of one of Saddam's Republican Guard Brigades and participation
in the bloody quelling of the 1991 uprising. The Falluja
Brigade command was then handed to a former Saddam intelligence
officer, Mohammed Abdul Latif. As insurgency activity unsurprisingly
soared once more in Falluja, coalition forces eventually
found the Falluja Brigade to be working 'with them' by day
and planning and executing insurgency activity by night.
The Brigade was eventually disbanded in September.
Whilst
the mess of the Falluja Brigade symbolises the incompetence
of the 're-Baathification' policy and has served to bring
us full circle back to where we were in April, there have
been far more dangerous repercussions of this policy. Allawi's
aggressive re-Baathification of the government and security
services has paved the way for such people as Amer al-Hashimi
to be appointed chief of staff of Iraq's new army. Al-Hashimi,
a Salafi ex-Major General in Saddam's army, was eventually
fired last August as it became apparent he was supplying
Salafi insurgents with intelligence and appointing them
to high ranks in the new army. More worryingly, not only
was al-Hashimi replaced by Mohammed Abdul-Qadr, former Baathist
Governor of Mosul and deputy chief of staff under Saddam,
but al-Hashimi himself has since been appointed an advisor
to the Ministry of Defence.
Allawi's
policy has also seen the appointment of Talib Al-Lahibi
as commander of the new Iraqi National Guard for the province
of Diyala. Al-Lahibi, a former Saddam officer, was eventually
arrested in September as it came to light he was leading
the insurgency in Diyala.
What
may prove to be Allawi's most close-to-home re-Baathification
blunder, was his appointment of former Baathist, Yousef
Khalaf Mahmood, as head of security for the Iraqi interim
cabinet - an individual who would never have been appointed
to such a post under de-Baathification. Mahmood was arrested
at the end of October after it transpired he was working
with the insurgents and had supplied them with the names
and addresses of every government official and ministerial
staff. Six staff and their family members have already been
murdered in their homes. Such a grave mistake will serve
to keep insurgents busy for months to come. And so, the
very people Iraq is relying upon to help its rebuilding
and democratisation are now sitting ducks.
Thanks
to the active reinstatement of Sunni elite and former Baathists,
leadership of the new Iraqi security forces is once again
Sunni-dominated, as it had been the four decades under Saddam.
The weeks and months have proved that not only are high
ranking Sunnis exacerbating Iraq's insecurity, but even
low ranking Sunnis cannot be relied upon to carry out their
duties - in one Iraqi unit alone in Operation Phantom Fury,
some 100 Sunni soldiers chose to desert their posts en route
to Falluja. So it's not a surprise that we find ourselves
in the position we are in and one thing is certain - relying
on the same pillars of power as Saddam did will ensure continued
infiltrations, desertions and insurgency.
Most
commentators and political advisors are now correctly identifying
the need for a political solution to couple the current
military operation in Falluja. However, they seem to have
learnt nothing from the past, as they are now advocating
the same policy that was adopted six months ago: calling
for increased Sunni and 'clean' Baathist representation
in order to somehow appease the Sunni population.
Washington
needs to be brave enough to discard Allawi's policy of re-Baathification
and Sunni-dominance and advocate what reality on the ground
has pointed to time and time again: de-Baathification coupled
with Shia-dominance in the leadership of the new security
forces is the only long-term option to crushing the insurgency
and moving Iraq towards democracy.
