Turning
the Muqtada Crisis into a Milestone for Iraqi Sovereignty
By
Sama Hadad & Adil Shalan
Wednesday, April 7, 2004
Clashes
in Baghdad and Iraq's south involving the followers of the
Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and coalition forces cast Iraq's
future into doubt. Dozens of Shias and 20 coalition troops
have been killed in the past 48 hours.
Ten million
Shia are expected to converge on the city of Karbala on
Sunday for the Arbaeen celebrations. In the current climate,
such a mass gathering has the potential to spark off a general
Shia uprising.
However, at
the same time, the US-led coalition has the opportunity
to transform the situation into a defining moment that demonstrates
to Iraqis their willingness to hand over sovereignty.
Both the Coalition
authorities and Muqtada al-Sadr have been raising the stakes.
Iraq is currently at the brink of needless bloodshed - a
fact both sides seem to only realise now, with Muqtada advising
his headquarters in the Baghdad district of Shuala on Monday
to "try to calm things down", and the coalition
agreeing to one of the demands of Al-Sadr's people, which
was to leave Shuala. In the grand scheme of things, however,
neither front wants to appear to be backing down, and it
is clear that third-party involvement is requisite.
Al-Sadr's
Background
Coalition authorities
have had difficulty understanding Muqtada al-Sadr, and even
greater difficulty dealing with him. His status amongst
his followers arises from his family lineage and this is
key to understanding the current situation.
The Sadr family
has a history of a long line of clerics held in prestige
in Iraq. The family came to prominence through Muqtada's
great-uncle, Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr. Mohammed B. al-Sadr
was a child-prodigy, attaining the level of ayatollah, or
theological expert, by the age of 17. By the age of 30 he
had authored 'Our Philosophy' and 'Our Economics', which
are to this day the most authoritative Shia books in their
respected fields. His contemporary views often clashed with
the more traditional Shia clergy in Najaf, most notably
on the issue of politics. The traditional view states that
during the occultation of the twelfth and last Shia saint,
involvement in politics is forbidden. Mohammed B. al-Sadr
disagreed both with this view and with Khomeini's radical
notion of Wilayat Al-Faqih, or 'Rule of the Religious Jurist'.
Instead, he proposed the idea of Wilayat Al-Ummah 'Ala Nafsiha,
or the 'Rule of the People Upon Themselves' - an early concept
of Islamic democracy. In 1957, al-Sadr founded the Islamic
Dawa Party which rapidly became a threat to Saddam's Ba'ath
regime. On April 9, 1980, Mohammed B. Sadr, along with his
sister Amina al-Sadr, was executed by Saddam Hussein.
In the late
1990s, Muqtada's father, Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, attempted
to pick up where his uncle had left off. Unlike Mohammed
B. al-Sadr who drew his support from Iraq's educated middle-class,
his nephew drew his support from the largely uneducated
working class. Cautious of the regime, Mohammed S. al-Sadr
avoided creating an intellectual movement and instead rallied
people at Friday sermons on emotional issues. Some experts
believed that this was part of a two-stage strategy - first
gaining the support of the masses and then utilizing this
to politically educate them. Within months he commanded
the loyalty of millions of Shia from all over Iraq. Saddam
Hussein recognised him as a threat and had him assassinated,
along with his two eldest sons, in a street market in 1999.
After the fall
of the regime, Muqtada inherited much of his father's support.
However, he lacked his father's religious authority, political
understanding, and foresight. He is locked in the first
stage of his father's plan, unable to intellectually progress
his supporters.
Before the
establishment of the Iraqi Governing Council he behaved
himself very well, and appeared on Al-Jazeera in May speaking
positively of the US presence. However, this affirmative
attitude soon changed, when he was not included in the 25-member
Governing Council. Feeling marginalised, he has grown progressively
more hostile and critical of the US-led Coalition and Governing
Council.
In the past
year, Muqtada has found himself in a situation for which
he does not have the capacity. He often contradicts himself
from one week to the next, not really sure what he wants
or how to achieve it. Close aides of Muqtada recognise his
limitations but feel they have no alternative to him. His
frustrations at being marginalised and the hardships faced
by many of his supporters have fed into each other to create
the conditions for the current clash.
Turning
the situation around
The heavy-handed
way the coalition has handled the situation has helped swell
Muqtada's following. The first mistake was to close the
little-read Hawza newspaper on the grounds of inciting violence
against coalition troops - a charge more pertinent to Al-Jazeera
and Al-Arabia news channels. Subsequent decisions have been
ill-timed and ill-thought out, turning the situation from
bad to worse.
If Ambassador
Bremer continues to listen to over-zealous advice, on the
eve of the Shia celebration of Arba'en when ten million
Iraqis are expected to converge on Karbala, a Shia uprising
may become inevitable. There are groups within Iraq that
would like to see nothing else. On Monday two packed cars
from Fallujah pulled up in the Shoula district of Baghdad
to "fight" with their Shia brothers. Raising the
stakes once more by arresting the troublesome cleric will
strengthen his support and turn even those who don't support
him against the coalition.
However, a
dramatic change in approach can change the situation from
a potential bloodbath to a great steppingstone to Iraqi
sovereignty. What is clear is the situation requires a third
party to step in, and only an Iraqi body can successfully
negotiate with Muqtada. Bremer should transfer control of
the situation to the Iraqi Governing Council and give them
far-reaching powers to resolve the Muqtada issue once and
for all.
The Shia members
of the Governing Council will then be in a position to strike
a deal with Muqtada to put an end to the violence and to
disband his Mehdi militia. In return, the Governing Council
would reopen the Hawza newspaper; release Sayyid Yaqoubi
on bail while he awaits a trial; and to secretly guarantee
a seat for one of Muqtada's representatives on an expanded
Governing Council in June. This would be the only sure way
of pacifying Muqtada's opposition to the US-led coalition
since he will be part an expanded Governing Council - which
is what he has always wanted. By giving the Governing Council
the power and independence to deal with this crisis it will
demonstrate to Iraqis that the transfer of sovereignty is
not a sham.
While such
a strategy may appear unappealing at first, what is certain
is that the current heavy-handed approach is only making
the situation worse and has reached a dead-end.
What this incidence
demonstrates is that the Governing Council needs to be expanded
to be more representative of Iraqis. Marginalising significant
sections of society will undoubtedly cause problems for
Iraq's transition period. Furthermore, it highlights the
danger if, come 1 July and the handover of sovereignty to
a new Iraqi government, the Shia feel somehow cheated of
power.
