By Ahmed Alaskary and
Ali Latif
September 21, 2006
The way forward
in Iraq
- After a period of uncertainty
over what to do in Iraq, essentially two views have emerged from Washington:
- Abandon Iraq
This case has been presented in several forms:
- Split Iraq up into 3 autonomous regions based on
sectarian lines.
- Establish a new friendly dictatorship after convening with local
neighbors
- Allow civil war to
take place and one clear winner will emerge
- A short-term
increase in the number of troops
A measure to deal with the Baathist – Jihadist insurgency.
- The abandon Iraq option
will hand 'victory' to the insurgency which seeks to oust the US from Iraq
and overthrow its nascent democratic government. The ramifications of a
post-withdrawal Iraq will be felt for years to come as Salafi-Wahabi terrorists
from the region will transform western and central Iraq into a terrorist
haven. Furthermore, the more the US disengages and undermines moderates
in Iraq, the more Iranian influence will grow.
- Abandoning democracy
will be the ultimate nail in the coffin for the US desire for a new Middle
East. The perceived failure in any of these scenarios will embolden the
dictatorial regimes in the region, which are the breeding grounds for global
Salafi-Wahabi Islamist terrorist groups.
- An increase in troops,
particularly in Baghdad is necessary to stop the continuous bloodshed and
downward spiral to civil war. Securing the capital requires doing
the job that was never done – destroying the Sunni-dominated Baath Party
intelligence and security apparatus, which provides the backbone, the brains
and the logistics of the insurgency in Iraq. This will free Iraq's Sunni
community from this shadow and allow them to fully take part in the democratic
process and embrace the national reconciliation process, as their democratically
elected leaders have urged. Furthermore, improving security
from terrorists attacks will undermine the militias and provide Iraq's government
with the necessary conditions to take on the militias.
- Positive steps such
as the tribes of Anbar agreeing to unite against Al-Qaeda
and the reforms being implemented in the security forces provide the impetus
for the US and Iraqi governments to carry on working towards stabilizing
Iraq and consolidating its democratic future.
Moqtada and
the Mehdi Army
- On the issue of Moqtada
Al-Sadr, several commentators have admitted that he must be dealt with politically,
not militarily, and he must now be grudgingly accepted as a legitimate political
player. His embrace of the political process and pubic calls for restraint
over the last year demonstrate he is amenable to abandoning violence.
- There is growing doubt
over how much control Moqtada actually has over the Mehdi Army militia.
The incident in Diwaniyah last month, where Moqtada called for the
Mahdi Army to put down its arms without success indicates there are elements
in the Mahdi Army who are not loyal to Moqtada.
- And this presents itself
as an opportunity. Moqtada Al-Sadr should be encouraged to recruit elements
of the Mehdi Army which are both loyal to him and do not have blood on their
hands to take on the rogue elements of the Mehdi army as part of a combined
effort by the Iraqi government. The National Reconciliation Plan can serve
as the vehicle for bringing about such a plan and can be coordinated by
his representatives in parliament.
